The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to commercialize their research. University laboratories therefore have two sources of funds: direct grants from the government and funds from commercialization. In addition to giving direct subsidies to university laboratories, the government also subsidizes the commercial sector, for example, through tax credits. Subsidies to commerce contribute indirectly to the university's research budget, because they increase the pro…t from commercialization. This paper investigates the optimal mix of direct and indirect subsidies to the university, in a context where the role of university research is to turn up "ideas" for commercial investments, and the role of commerce is to turn the ideas into innovations. It also asks whether there is an argument for protecting "ideas" as well as commercializations, as is authorized by the Bayh-Dole Act.
Introduction
Public subsidies to R&D go both to private …rms and to noncommercial laboratories, such as those in universities. About half of public subsidies in the U.S. go to commercial …rms.
These subsidies take many forms, from tax credits to competitively given grants, administered in a way that is similar to the university grant process. 1 With the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, university research became less dependent on grants, and more dependent on commercialization. In order for the university to pro…t from commercializations, the knowledge they create must be protectable. That is what the Bayh-Dole Act authorized. This raises two questions: First, what is the best way to subsidize research?
Given that the university can pro…t indirectly from subsidies given to commerce, how should government subsidies be divided between subsidies to commerce and direct subsidies to universities? Second, is the premise of the Bayh-Dole Act welfare-improving? That is, should the knowledge turned up in universities be protectable?
The premise of this paper is that there are two distinct research activities: the activity of turning up ideas and the activity of turning the ideas into innovations. These are assumed to take place in two sectors, loosely called universities and …rms. Universities (and other public laboratories) are mainly charged with producing "knowledge,"interpreted here as a ‡ow of ideas or investment opportunities. Firms commercialize the ideas. I thus follow O'Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), Scotchmer (1999) , Scotchmer (2007, 2009) in distinguishing between ideas for investment and the investments or innovations themselves. However, in the earlier papers, the idea generation process was taken as primitive. Here, similarly to Banal-Estañol and Macho-Stadler (2010), I conceive of idea generation as costly. This has the defect of obscuring what is primitive (apparently the meta-idea to invest in the idea-generation process), but maps rather closely to the institutions through which knowledge is created.
An important distinction at the heart of this investigation -and at the heart of any discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act -is whether the ideas produced in universities are pro- tectable. Here, I distinguish between protectable ideas and protectable innovations. The "idea"is an investment opportunity, such as an idea for how to create a new product or an improvement to an old product, or to make a cost reduction in producing an old product.
The idea becomes an innovation if a …rm invests in implementing it. I assume that the implementation is patentable, but the idea might not be. I study this as a policy choice.
If the idea is protectable, then it can be auctioned exclusively to a commercializing …rm, and the university will collect the pro…t. If the idea is not protectable, the university cannot auction the exclusive use of it. Because university researchers publish, the idea will enter the public domain, and there may be a patent race to commercialize it. The patent race will dissipate pro…t. Even though the commercial winner of the patent race will have a protected product, the …rms in the patent race make zero pro…t in expectation, and the university gets nothing. Thus, if the Bayh-Dole Act serves the purpose of creating funds for university research, it is because the ideas it turns up are protectable. If ideas are not protectable, the university must depend entirely on direct subsidies for its research budget.
If ideas are protectable, the university earns money by commercializing ideas under the Bayh-Dole Act.
The subsidy policies considered below have two parts: an investment tax credit for the commercial sector, and direct subsidies to universities. The objective is to study the optimal mix of these two subsidies in the two cases that ideas are protectable or not protectable. This paper is built on the premise that all the pro…t earned by the university through commercialization, as well as the direct subsidies, are spent in research. More particularly, I
assume that the university wants to maximize its research spending to the extent allowed by its budget. This seems like a natural assumption, and one that is descriptive. Universities probably want to maximize fame and visibility. Research serves that purpose.
However, since the university's objective is not social welfare, this raises a question about optimality. Is it possible that commercialization is so lucrative that the university spends too much, rather than too little, on generating ideas? The university wants to maximize research spending, whereas a social planner would want to maximize social welfare. When 2 do these objectives con ‡ict, given that the government controls much of the purse?
Section 2 presents a model of idea generation and commercialization. Section 3 characterizes the optimal subsidy policy when ideas are protectable. The main conclusions are that Direct subsidies to universities "prime the pump"in the sense that a subsidy increases university spending by more than the subsidy.
Because universities maximize research rather than pro…t, they may overspend on research. Direct subsidies are only optimal if commercialization is not very pro…table.
If direct subsidies are not optimal and not provided, then tax credits for commercialization should be smaller than when direct subsidies are provided.
Section 4 recognizes that when ideas are protectable, idea generation could alternatively be provided by a pro…t-maximizing …rm. Would that be better? Here I conclude A pro…t-maximizing …rm will spend less on idea generation than is optimal, regardless of subsidies, and less than the research-maximizing university.
Direct subsidies to a pro…t-maximizing …rm crowd out its own private spending, whereas direct subsidies "prime the pump" in research-maximizing universities. 
A model
There are two types of research: university research that produces a stream of ideas for commercial investments, and the commercial investments themselves. Universities and …rms have di¤erent objectives. The objective of universities is to maximize their research output (the number of ideas generated). The objective of …rms is to maximize pro…t.
Following Scotchmer (1999) , ideas are drawn from a distribution F; with density f; where f (v; c) is the density of ideas with per-period social value v and development cost c: Figure 1 shows a space of "ideas" (v; c) ; with cost on the vertical axis and per-period social value v on the horizontal axis. The value v is the per-period social value if the good is supplied competitively, with total discounted value v=r. We suppose that a proprietary supplier could collect a fraction < 1 of this value, that is, v=r.
In …gure 1, if tax credits are not provided, only the ideas (v; c) under the line v=r will be developed. Suppose, however, the government gives a tax credit, so that the developer only bears a fraction of the cost.
The main purpose of the tax credit is to overcome a problem of appropriability, to increase the probability that an idea will be commercialized. As we will see, the tax credit 4 has an additional e¤ect as well. It increases the pro…t on inframarginal ideas that would be commercialized even without the tax credit, and feeds back into university research.
With a tax credit 2 [0; 1), an idea (v; c) is pro…table when
This raises the threshold line in …gure 1, and adds ideas to the development pool.
If the tax credit satis…es (1 ) = ; then all ideas with cost below the v=r threshold will be developed. However, such a high subsidy is usually not optimal. Aside from the deadweight loss that reduces social value, critics of government spending usually suppose that subsidies lead to waste. For example, the tax credit may be used for expenditures that are not related to an R&D project. Accordingly, I shall assume that for every project that is subsidized at rate , there is a waste K ( ), where K is convex, increasing, and
I assume that the waste is not a pure transfer, but rather that at least part of it is social waste due to ine¢ cient actions.
Write P ( ) for the probability that an idea is commercialized and ( ) for the average pro…tability of ideas, taking account of the fact that an idea might not be commercialized.
Write ( ) for the average social value of an idea. Then
where d 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of social value that is deadweight loss.
The functions P and are increasing. A higher tax credit increases the probability of commercialization by reducing the private cost, and increases the commercializers'private pro…t on inframarginal ideas. The expected pro…tability of an idea is positive because the inframarginal ideas (below the line marked v r(1 ) in …gure 1) are pro…table.
I assume that the university's research program turns up ideas for commercial investment at a Poisson rate (x), where x is the ‡ow rate of spending on generating ideas. Because ideas are generated at the rate (x) per period, and each idea yields expected social value ( ) ; the ‡ow of social value created is (x) ( ) dt and the ‡ow of costs is xdt: Thus, social welfare can be written as the following function of (x; ):
Let (x ; ) be the maximizers of (2). Thus, is the maximizer of ( ) ; and (x ; )
The optimum cannot be achieved directly because spending is not directly under the control of the social planner. The planner's tool to encourage e¢ cient spending is a subsidy policy, namely, a pair (s; ), where s is a direct subsidy to the university or other institution that invests in generating ideas, and is a tax credit to the commercial sector. The spending s + b generates a hit rate (b + s) of ideas, and each idea returns an expected pro…t ( ). The university's net expected revenue at each point in time is
With discounting, the university's budgetary surplus is (4).
6 University contribution, b Now consider the optimal subsidies (s; ) : The optimal tax credit is described in Proposition 1. Proof: That > 0 follows from
Since K 0 (0) = 0; it follows that 0 (0) > 0: It must hold that < (1 ) because otherwise some of the the integrand in the de…nition of ( ) is negative and 0 ( ) < 0.
Moving from a subsidy rate of = 0 to a positive subsidy rate, there is a bene…t from increasing the probability that an idea is commercialized, but only negligible waste. As the subsidy approaches the level = 1 ; the marginal ideas that enter the development pool provide negative social value, both because of deadweight loss and because the subsidy entails a waste K:
Now consider direct subsidies to the university, s: Figure 2 shows the university's spending when the direct subsidy is 0 and when the direct subsidy is s > 0; namelyb (0; ) andb (s; ).b (0; ) is described by the intersection of the curve ( ) (b) with the diagonal, and similarly forb (s; ). Assumption 1 ensures that the intersection in each case is at a positive level of spending. Figure 2 shows that an increase in s or in will raise the curve and cause university spending to increase. This answers the question whether subsidies crowd out university spending or increase it. Instead of crowding out, public subsidies "prime the pump." They have both a direct e¤ect and indirect e¤ect on idea generation. The indirect e¤ect is that the direct subsidy leads to pro…table ideas that feed more money into the university's budget, allowing the university to increase its spending on research even more. The government's objective is to set a subsidy policy that achieves the (x ; ) that maximizes (2). As already described, maximizes ( ) ; and x satis…es (3).
However, it might or might not be possible to achieve the optimum (x ; ) : If it is possible, the optimal subsidy policy (s; ) satis…es s +b (s; ) = x (7) Figure 3 shows why it might not be possible to achieve the optimum. In …gure 3, social welfare is 1=r times the di¤erence between the curve ( ) (b) and the diagonal line b: The optimal level of university spending is shown as the value x that satis…es (3). (c) When ( ) > ; again using (5),b (0; ) > x ; that is, universities overspend.
The following shows that reducing increases social welfare. Ideas become less lucrative, so less money is poured into the generation of ideas.
Write social welfare (2) aŝ
Di¤erentiating at (s; ) = (0; )
Using ( In addition, at an optimum no improvement can be made by increasing : The derivative of social welfare with respect to is
The second line is zero from (10), and if < ; 0 ( ) > 0: Therefore an improvement can be made by increasing ; which contradicts that (s; ) is optimal.
Thus, if (s; ) is optimal and < ; s = 0:
Corollary 1 [Optimal mix of subsidies] It is never optimal to subsidize the university directly without subsidizing the commercialization of ideas, but it might be optimal to subsidize the commercialization of ideas without giving direct subsidies to the university. 
Idea Generation as a Commercial Enterprise
An implication of the above analysis is that idea generation can be pro…table even without direct subsidies. If so, private …rms should be willing to invest in the generation of ideas as well as in commercialization. Indeed, large established …rms maintain research divisions that operate like university laboratories. Their researchers are given free rein to pursue their interests, in the expectation that they will spin out commercially valuable ideas.
This section points to some defects of depending on the private market for idea generation.
In …gure 4, social welfare is 1=r times the distance between the curve labeled ( ) (x) and the diagonal. The socially optimal level of spending is x ( ) :
If the …rm receives a direct subsidy s; its pro…t as a function of (s; ) is given by
Let b p (s; ) be the …rm's most pro…table level of spending, which satis…es
In …gure 4, when there is no direct subsidy to the …rm (s = 0) ; private pro…t from the idea-generation process is 1=r times the distance between the curve labeled ( ) (x) and the diagonal. If ( ) < ( ) as shown, 2 then b p (0; ), is smaller than the socially optimal level of spending, x ( ) : This is true for every ; not just the optimal : Thus, although the private sector will …nd it pro…table to invest in a costly process of generating ideas, its spending will be less than optimal, provided ( ) < ( ).
If a direct subsidy s > 0 is provided, it directly crowds out private spending. It is immediate from the …rm's pro…t-maximizing condition (11) is pocketed by the …rm.
Proposition 4 contrasts with Proposition 2, which shows that because universities maximize research rather than pro…t, an increase in the subsidy causes their own contribution to increase rather than decrease. For research-maximizing universities, direct subsidies prime the pump, whereas for pro…t-making …rms, direct subsidies crowd out private spending. 3 5 Optimal Subsidies (s; ) when Ideas are not Protectable
Now suppose that ideas go into the public domain instead of being protected. There is a long standing theory, originating with Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) that because R&D produces knowledge, and because knowledge is a public good, it should be produced with public funds and made freely available. Although that theory was rejected by the Bayh-Dole Act, it is still persuasive. I now investigate whether social welfare would be higher in this model by embracing it. The answer turns out to be no.
If ideas are made freely available, the tax credit should be smaller than ; in order to reduce the pro…tability of ideas, and to discourage patent races. Patent races are ine¢ cient in this model because they entail duplicated costs. When ideas are protectable, patent races are avoided by auctioning exclusive licenses. When ideas are in the public domain, patent races cannot be controlled except by modifying the size of the reward. The tax subsidy is the available instrument to do this, but reducing the tax credit has the deleterious e¤ect of eliminating some marginal ideas from the pool of commercialized ideas.
When ideas are not protectable, social welfare is given by the following, where ( ) is subtracted from social welfare because …rms in a race will dissipate the entire pro…t. This is a waste of resources in expected amount ( ) :
With the pro…t subtracted from social welfare, social welfare is only the consumers'surplus provided by innovations, less the social waste of providing the tax credit.
Let the optimizers be (ŝ;^ ). These satisfy
Proposition 5 [Ideas should be protected.] The optimal tax credit and the optimal spending on idea generation are lower when ideas are not protectable than when protectable. This leads to a lower rate of idea generation and fewer commercialized ideas. If it is optimal to make direct subsidies in both regimes, optimized social welfare is higher when ideas are protectable than when not protectable.
Proof : Let (s ; ) be the optimal subsidies when ideas are protectable and let (ŝ;^ )
be the optimal subsidies when ideas are not protectable. Since maximizes ; the …rst order condition (12b) implies that^ < . This implies that a smaller fraction of ideas are commercialized when ideas are not protectable (see …gure 1). That s +b (s ; ) >ŝ follows from comparing (3) with (12a), using concavity of together with ( (^ ) (^ )) < ( ) and s +b (s ; ) = x ( ) :
Social welfare is higher when ideas are protectable because
Proposition 5 is not an unquali…ed statement that society is better o¤ with patent protection. It only says that, when commercializations are patentable, society might be better o¤ making the ideas patentable as well. Due to patents on the commercialized products, there will be deadweight loss whether or not ideas are patentable. The important consequence of protection on the idea itself is that protection allows a proprietor to control the development process. This conclusion resonates with an idea of Kitch (1977) , who argued that patents at an early stage are socially valuable because they give the rightsholder an incentive to "prospect" for uses of the protected intellectual property. Prospecting and control rights are not exactly the same. Here, there is no need for prospecting -the idea for a commercial development is turned up in the university's research.
I argue in chapter 5 of my (2004) book that private optimality in exercising control rights can diverge from social optimality if there are social bene…ts to patent races or other forms of competition that the initial patent holder would control. In this model, patent races are unequivocally wasteful, and there is no con ‡ict between the privately optimal way to develop ideas and the socially optimal way to develop ideas.
6 Conclusion: Some re ‡ections on basic and applied research
It is tempting to think of idea generation in universities as "basic" research, and to think of commercialization as "applied" research. However, there are no agreed-upon de…nitions of those terms. Basic research is often understood as research with no commercial value which lays a foundation for commercial products. It is a short leap to the conclusion that basic research, having no commercial value, must be subsidized, and therefore must take place in universities or public laboratories with grant support.
On closer inspection, the pro…t distinction between basic and applied research is shaky.
When a laboratory …nds a drug target (but not the drug), is that basic research? If the drug target is patentable, it has commercial value. The commercial value is not intrinsic to the technology, but rather to the legal rule. Similarly, ideas in the above model have commercial value if they are protected, but not otherwise. Whether an idea has commercial value depends on the legal rule, not on the nature of the technology. The model in this paper is focussed on institutional incentives rather than on the incentives of the individual researcher. The key assumption is that the university wants to maximize research rather than pro…t. This leads to the conclusion that the university might spend more on research than is socially optimal, particularly when commercialization is extremely pro…table. In the hands of a pro…t-maximizing …rm, the spending on idea generation might be un…xably low.
The aspiration of the Bayh-Dole Act is to protect university-generated knowledge so that the knowledge can be licensed for pro…t. This aspiration con ‡icts with a basic economic principle, namely, that it is ine¢ cient to exclude anyone from using a public good such as knowledge (or an idea). However, the model above gives a foundation for why the BayhDole Act might make sense, despite the more traditional view. Free access to ideas leads to ine¢ cient patent races which can be avoided through licensing. At the same time, this defense of the Bayh-Dole Act is based on another second-best arrangement, namely, that the commercialized products are themselves protected.
